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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is founded in Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2(4), and 
78-2a-3(2)(j), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the Trial Court correctly hold that plaintiff Meadow Valley was entitled 
to summary judgment and that defendant Transcontinental Insurance Company 
owed a duty to provide insurance coverage, investigate claims, defend and 
indemnify Meadow Valley for any and all claims made as a result of the damage 
caused by the flooding identified in Meadow Valley's complaint? 
Issues decided upon a motion for summary judgment raise questions of 
law and are accorded no deference by the Appellate Court. See. Crossroads 
Plaza Assoc, v. Pratt. 912 P.2d 961 (Utah 1996); Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County. 
855P.2d231 (Utah 1993). 
1 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
On March 25,1999, Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. ("Meadow Valley") 
brought this action against Transcontinental Insurance Company 
('Transcontinental") for breach of Transcontinental's duty to defend, investigate, 
and indemnify Meadow Valley for claims arising out of flood damage to third party 
property owners which occurred on or about May 24,1997. (R.1-4). Meadow 
Valley filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was heard by the Trial Court 
on January 31, 2000. (R.224). After reviewing the undisputed facts and applying 
the appropriate law, the Trial Court granted Meadow Valley's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and ordered Transcontinental "to provide insurance coverage, 
investigate, defend and indemnify Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. for any and all 
claims made as a result of the damage caused by the flooding identified in 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of Meadow Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial 
Court reviewed the following undisputed facts: 
1. On or about May 24,1997, Meadow Valley, Inc. was the general 
contractor for the highway construction project from 1-15,1-215 to 2600 South in 
Woods Cross. The owner of the project was the Utah Department of 
Transportation. (R.54-55, 64,117-118). 
2. Meadow Valley and B.T. Gallegos Construction Company, Inc. 
("Gallegos") entered into a subcontract agreement wherein Gallegos agreed to 
build and/or install certain storm drainage structures and related items for the 
project. (R.55, 64, 75-76,163). 
3. Prior to May 24,1997, Gallegos removed a manhole and small pipes 
in preparation to install larger pipes and related structures to accommodate water 
drainage. In addition, Gallegos had formed and poured concrete walls and slabs 
for installation of a concrete outlet box for the project. (R.55,151). 
4. In order to construct the concrete outlet box, Gallegos diverted an 
on-going stream of water into a previously existing drainage ditch. (R.52, 53, 
164, 186, 88, 224 at 10-11). 
5. In order to facilitate the diversion of the water into the pre-existing 
drainage ditch, Gallegos constructed a small channel to take the water flowing 
into the storm drain system and direct it into the pre-existing ditch. (R.152-153, 
164,186, 188, 224 at 11). 
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6. On or about May 24,1997, it began to rain heavily at the 
construction site. (R.55,118,152). 
7. As a result of the heavy rain, water normally handled by the storm 
drain system, which Gallegos channeled around the work site into the existing 
ditch, flooded the entire area and near-by businesses. (R. 154). 
8. Gallegos' employee, Mr. Maughan, made attempts to remove forms 
from the outlet box so water could flow through the box and back into the storm 
drain system. (R.56,154). 
9. Meadow Valley employee, Mr. Jessop, attempted to stabilize the 
ditch to avoid further flood damage. (R.56,154). 
10. Mr. Maughan and Mr. Jessop worked together to obtain a large track 
hoe to stabilize the ditch. Thereafter, Mr. Maughan and Mr. Jessop agreed to ( 
remove an existing metal pipe to allow the water to flow back into the outlet box 
and the storm drain system. (R. 119,154,165,186-187). 
11. Pursuant to the subcontract agreement, Gallegos was required to 
purchase a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy with an 
endorsement naming Meadow Valley as an additional insured. (R.71). 
12. Gallegos purchased a CGL policy which named Meadow Valley as 
an additional insured pursuant to a blanket additional insured endorsement. < 
(R.138-139). . ; 
13. The insurance policy issued by Transcontinental naming Meadow 
Valley as an additional insured provides coverage to Meadow Valley as follows: 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. That person or organization is only an 
additional insured with respect to liability arising out of: 
a. premises you own, rent, lease, or occupy; 
or 
b. "y°ur work" for that additional insured by or 
for you. 
2. The limits of insurance applicable to the 
additional insured are those specified in the written 
contractor agreement or in the declarations for this 
policy, whichever is less. These limits of insurance are 
inclusive and not in addition to the limits of insurance 
shown on the declarations. 
(R.138). 
14. The insurance policy defines "your work" as follows: 
a. work or operations performed by you or on 
your behalf; and 
b. materials, parts, or equipment furnished in 
connection with such work or operations. 
"Your work" includes: 
a. Warranties or representations made at any 
time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, 
performance or use of "your work"; and 
b. the providing of or failure to provide 
warnings or instructions. 
(R.137). 
15. As a result of the flooding, several businesses have made claims 
against Meadow Valley, totaling $420,472.90. (R.142). 
16. Meadow Valley has made several tenders of defense to 
Transcontinental requesting it to honor its duty to defend and indemnify Meadow 
Valley pursuant to the insurance contract issued by Transcontinental wherein 
5 
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Meadow Valley was named as an additional insured. Transcontinental has 
refused these tenders of defense. (R.142). 
17. As a result of Transcontinental's rejection of the tenders of defense, 
Meadow Valley filed an action against Gallegos for breach of its subcontract and 
against Transcontinental for breach of its duties under the insurance contract. 
(R.1-4). 
18. On May 14,1999, Transcontinental filed a Motion to Sever the 
claims Meadow Valley made pursuant to the insurance coverage against 
Transcontinental from the claims Meadow Valley made against Gallegos 
i 
pursuant to the subcontract. The Motion to Sever was granted. (R.23, 52). 
19. In its Motion to Sever, Transcontinental stated, "The question of 
whether B.T. Gallegos was negligent in the performance of its subcontract work ' 
is completely separate from the question of whether the plaintiff was covered as 
an additional insured under the insurance agreement with Transcontinental." 
(R.26). (Emphasis added). 
20. Transcontinental also asserts that, "In the case at hand, there is no 
logical relationship between the negligence claim against B.T. Gallegos and the 
contract claim against Transcontinental,..." (R.29). 
21. On December 1,1999, Meadow Valley filed a partial motion for < 
summary judgment against Transcontinental requesting the Court order 
Transcontinental to honor its duties to indemnify and defend Meadow Valley 
i 
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under the insurance contract to which Meadow Valley was named as an 
additional insured. (R146-147). 
22. Meadow Valley's motion for partial summary judgment was granted. 
(R.216-218). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment was properly granted in the present circumstances as 
the undisputed facts clearly indicate that the flooding in question arose from the 
construction of the drainage system pursuant to the Gallegos subcontract. The 
insurance contract to which Meadow Valley was named as an additional insured 
provides coverage to Meadow Valley because the flooding "arose out of 
Gallegos' work. Whether Meadow Valley is covered under the Transcontinental 
policy does not require a determination of negligence or an assessment of fault. 
Rather, the overwhelming majority of cases dealing with the issue have held that 
when determining coverage under an insurance policy, the term "arising out of is 
considered synonymous with "originating" or "come into being" as opposed to 
"proximate cause". Thus, the issues of fact asserted by Transcontinental are not 
genuine or material to the determination of coverage in this case, and the court 
appropriately applied the law to the relevant facts. 
Finally, the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1 are inapplicable to the 
insurance policy in question. Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1 applies to indemnification 
provisions contained in construction contracts, not contracts for insurance such 
as that issued by Transcontinental. 
7 
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In accordance with the foregoing, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's 
grant of summary judgment. , 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT. < 
A. There are no Genuine Issues of Material Fact. -
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of 
i 
material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). The fact that a party disputes facts "does not 
preclude summary judgment simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but { 
only when a material fact is genuinely controverted." Heqlar Ranch. Inc.. v. 
Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390,1391 (Utah 1980); see also. Atkinson v. IHC Hospitals. 
798 P.2d 733 at n.17 (Utah 1990) ("the rule on summary judgment may apply 
even when some fact remains in dispute; we affirm summary judgment when all 
material facts are not genuinely controverted.") 
As will be shown below, the issues of fault, negligence and proximate 
causation are not relevant with respect to a determination of insurance coverage < 
in this case. Those are issues which are, instead, relevant in relation to the 
litigation between Meadow Valley and Gallegos which was previously severed by 
i 
the Trial Court on motion of Transcontinental. 
Transcontinental has admitted all facts necessary for the Trial Court to 
make the legal determination in favor of coverage in this case. Transcontinental < 
8 
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admitted that Gallegos contracted to construct a concrete outlet drainage box 
pursuant to the subcontract. Transcontinental admitted that Gallegos diverted an 
existing stream of water around the concrete box and channeled the water into 
existing ditches. Transcontinental admits that the water which flooded the 
businesses in question originated from an existing stream of water which 
Gallegos channeled into the existing ditches. Finally, Transcontinental admits that 
a Gallegos employee (Mr. Maughan) worked with a Meadow Valley employee 
(Mr. Jessop) before and during the flooding incident. These employees were 
engaged in work specifically related to the construction work being performed 
pursuant to the Gallegos construction subcontract. These facts, and these facts 
alone, are sufficient for this Court to affirm the Trial Court's grant of summary 
judgment. 
B. The Flood "Arose out of Gallegos' Work. 
Based upon well-settled precedent, Transcontinental's appeal fails for the 
same reason as its opposition failed below. The only question presented on 
appeal (despite Transcontinental's claim that there are facts in dispute) is a 
purely legal determination of the interpretation of an insurance contract. It is clear 
that the interpretation of contractual language contained within an insurance 
policy "is a question of law that may be resolved by the court in the context of a 
motion for summary judgment." Cypress Plateau Mining Corporation v. 
Commonwealth Ins. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1379,1382 (D. Utah 1997). See also. 
West American Ins. Co. v. V&S, 145 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1998). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Transcontinental policy provides coverage for "an additional insured 
[Meadow Valley] with respect to liability arising out of: b. "your work" [Gallegos]
 ( 
for that additional insured [Meadow Valley] by or for you." (R.138). The policy 
defines "your work" as follows: 
a. work or operations performed by you or on 
your behalf; and 
b. materials, parts, or equipment furnished in 
connection with such work or operations. 
(R.137). 
Transcontinental's primary argument on appeal is the assertion that the 
flooding in this case was caused solely by the negligent actions of Meadow < 
Valley's employee, Richard Jessop, and, therefore, did not "arise out of" 
Gallegos' work. Contrary to Transcontinental's assertions, the majority of courts 
have held that the term "arising out of" is not synonymous with the idea of 
causation or negligence. As such, whether or not Meadow Valley was negligent 
in part or in whole is not determinative, and does not relieve Transcontinental of < 
its contractual duties to Meadow Valley under the insurance contract. 
In Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Svufv Enterprises. 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 557 (Cal.App. 
1st 1999), the court noted that the insurance policy to which the additional insured 
was named included the term "arising out of rather than specifically limiting 
coverage for the additional insured to situations where the additional insured 
faced vicarious liability for negligence on the part of the named insured. In an 
effort to define "arising out of", the Svufv court stated: i 
10 
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California courts have consistently given a broad 
interpretation to the terms "arising out of or "arising 
from" in various kinds of insurance provisions. It is 
settled that this language does not import any particular 
standard of causation or theory of liability into an 
insurance policy. Rather, it broadly links a factual 
situation with the event creating liability and connotes 
only a minimal causal connection or incidental 
relationship. ]d. at 562. 
In finding coverage for the additional insured, the Svufv court held: 
Insurance companies are free to, and commonly have, 
issued additional insured endorsements that specifically 
limit coverage to situations in which the additional 
insured is faced with vicarious liability for negligent 
conduct by the named insured... when an insurer 
chooses not to use such clearly limited language in an 
additional insured clause, but instead grants coverage 
for liability 'arising out of the named insured's work, the 
additional insured is covered without regard to whether 
the injury was caused by the named insured or the 
additional insured. 
jd. at 562-63. See also. Container Corp. of America v. Maryland Cas. Co.. 707 
So.2d 733, 736 (Fla. 1998) (if the insurance company wished to limit coverage to 
vicarious liability for negligence, it would have done so by clear policy language); 
Merchant's Ins. Co. of New Hampshire v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty. 
143 F.3d 5,10 (1st Cir. 1998) (if insurance company intends to limit coverage to 
vicarious liability of a named insured, it is free to draft a policy that expressly 
implements that intention); Casualty Ins. Co. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty 
Ins. Co.. 501 N.E.2d 812, 814-815 (III. App. Ct. 1986) (coverage does not depend 
on the fault of a named insured). 
11 
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In Mclntosch v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.. 992 F.2d 251 (10,n Cir. 1993), Wichita 
Festivals, Inc. ("Festivals") contracted to operate the 1988 Wichita River Festival , 
for the City of Wichita ("Wichita"). Pursuant to the contract, Festivals purchased 
liability insurance from Scottsdale naming Wichita as an additional insured. The 
additional insured endorsement provided coverage "with respect to liability arising 
out of operations performed for such insured by or on behalf of the named 
insured." ]d. at 254. During the Festival, Mclntosch was injured as a result of i 
Wichita's sole negligence. Wichita stipulated that it was 100% at fault and a 
judgment was awarded to Mclntosch. Scottsdale denied coverage to Wichita on 
the theory that coverage was limited to situations where there was vicarious 
liability for the named insured's negligence. The Mclntosch court held that the 
additional insured endorsement does not limit coverage to cases where the ( 
additional insured is held vicariously liable for a named insured's negligence, jd. 
at 254. The Court further held that Wichita was covered under the additional 
insured endorsement even though Wichita admitted liability, jd. at 255. 
In Merchants Ins. Co. of New Hampshire. Inc. v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co.. 143 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1998), a subcontractor purchased an insurance 
policy through USF&G and listed the general contractor as an additional insured. 
The insurance policy contained language strikingly similar to, if not exactly the < 
same as, the language contained in the policy issued by Transcontinental in the 
present case. During the course of the construction project, one of the 
< 
subcontractor's employees was injured due to negligent actions of the general 
12 
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contractor. The injured employee sued the general contractor, who then 
tendered the defense to USF&G. USF&G rejected the tender of defense under 
the theory that the additional insured endorsement did not afford coverage to the 
general contractor for the general contractor's own negligence. id. at 7. The 
general contractor then settled with the injured employee through the general ,-• 
contractor's insurance carrier, Merchant's Insurance Company. Merchant's 
Insurance Company then sued USF&G in a subrogation cause of action. ]d. 
In holding that USF&G's policy provided coverage to the general contractor 
for the general contractor's own negligence, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
held: 
The usual meaning ascribed to the phrase "arising out 
of" is much broader than "caused by"; the former phrase 
is considered synonymous with "originate" or come into 
being".... the expression "arising out of indicates a 
wider range of causation than the concept of proximate 
causation and tort law. 
jd. at 9 (citations omitted). 
In some cases, the use of the term "arising out of" has been interpreted in 
favor of the insurance company. However, these cases use the same definition 
of the term as the majority view discussed above. In Toll Bridge Authority v. 
Aetna Ins. Co.. 773 P.2d 906 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989), the Toll Bridge Authority 
('TBA") purchased insurance for its operation of a ferry system. A passenger of 
the ferry was injured while disembarking from the ferry to the dock. The 
passenger sued TBA alleging negligence. TBA sought coverage from Aetna for 
indemnity. At issue was a policy exclusion for incidents "arising out of the 
13 
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operations, maintenance, or use of any water craft...." id. at 908. The Trial 
Court granted Aetna's motion for summary judgment upholding the exclusion. < 
In affirming the Trial Court's ruling, the appellate court held that "[t]he 
phrase 'arising out of is unambiguous and has a broader meaning than 'caused 
by'or'resulted from'. It is ordinarily understood to mean'originating from', 
'having its origin in', 'growing out of, or 'flowing from'." id. at 908. Based on this 
definition, the court rejected TBA's claim that there were issues of fact as to ( 
proximate cause and negligence which would preclude summary judgment. jd. 
It is clear that whether Meadow Valley or Gallegos were negligent in whole 
or in part has no effect in the determination of coverage in this case. The issue 
before the court is whether the flooding in this case "arose out of, "originated", 
"came into being", "grew out of or "flowed from" work or operations being ( 
performed by Gallegos or on Gallegos' behalf pursuant to the subcontract. Given 
the undisputed facts considered by the Trial Court, it is clear that the water which 
eventually flooded the businesses in question originated and "flowed from" work 
and operations which had been performed by or for Gallegos, pursuant to the 
< 
subcontract. There is no question that the water originated from the existing 
stream of water for which the concrete outlet box was being constructed. (R.153, 
154,164,186, and 188). In fact, Gallegos constructed a channel to divert this < 
stream of water out of the storm drain into the existing ditch. (R.224 at 11). 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's order granting Meadow 
i 
Valley's motion for summary judgment. 
14 
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C. The Cases Cited by Transcontinental Have Been Distinguished 
and/or Overruled. 
Transcontinental relies on two Texas cases for the proposition that the 
flooding in this case did not "arise out of Gallegos' work or work performed on 
Gallegos' behalf. These cases have been distinguished/overruled by subsequent 
Texas cases. 
In Granite Const. Co. v. Bituminous Ins. Co.. 832 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App. 
1992), a trucking company (Brown) subcontracted with Granite to haul asphalt 
from a site owned by Granite. The subcontract provided that '"[a]ll material shall 
be F.O.B. [Brown's] truck at the source,' and that '[l]oading will be done at no cost 
to [Brown]'." Id. at 428. After being loaded by Granite, a Brown truck driver was 
injured when the truck he was driving overturned. Id. The truck driver sued 
Granite for negligently loading the truck. ]d. Granite tendered the defense of the 
lawsuit to Bituminous, Brown's insurer, based upon Granite's status as an 
additional insured. Id. Bituminous refused the tender of defense and Granite 
filed an action for declaratory relief, id. at 428-429. The Trial Court granted 
Bituminous' motion for summary judgment and ruled that the Bituminous policy 
did not provide coverage for Granite. ]d. 
The Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of Bituminous 
by interpreting the policy language as providing insurance coverage for Granite 
only for "operations performed for Granite by or on behalf of Brown." id. at 430. 
Looking beyond the insurance policy, the Granite court held that Granite was 
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being sued for negligent loading of the Brown truck, operations which were 
expressly the duty of Granite under the contract between Granite and Brown. 
Thus, the court interpreted the policy as unambiguously excluding coverage. ]d. 
In 1994, two years after the Granite decision, the United States District 
Court for the District of Texas followed the Granite decision as representative of 
Texas law. See, Northern Insurance Co. of New York v. Austin Commercial Inc.. 
908 F.Supp. 436 (D. Tex. N.D. 1994). The Northern Insurance Company of New 
York court held that additional insureds are covered "only for claims involving 
direct negligence on the part of the named insured." |d. at 437. 
i 
Transcontinental's reliance on the Granite and Northern Insurance 
Company of New York cases is wholly without merit as subsequent Texas cases 
have accepted the majority view relating to interpretation of the term "arising out ' 
of." Texas law began to change in 1999 when the Texas Court of Appeals dealt 
with an additional insurance endorsement contained in a commercial general 
liability policy which provided coverage to the additional insured for "liability 
arising out of the named insured's operations." Admiral Insurance Co. v. Trident 
Nal Inc.. 988 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. App. 1999) (emphasis added). In Admiral, a 
subcontractor (K.D.) entered into a service agreement with Trident to service an 
oil and gas facility owned by Trident. Id. at 452. Pursuant to the employment < 
contract, Trident was named as an additional insured to a CGL policy issued to 
K.D. by Admiral, id. While in the process of unloading Trident's tools from a 
Trident truck, a K.D. employee was seriously injured when a compressor 
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exploded, jd. at 453. Neither the K.D. employee "nor anyone employed by K.D. 
performed any act or failed to perfc m any act that caused the compressor to 
explode." ]d. The K.D. employee sued Trident for tort damages. Trident 
tendered the defense of the case to Admiral as an additional insured under the 
K.D. policy. Admiral rejected the tender of defense. 
Admiral's argument for rejecting Trident's tender of defense was that 
"absent an affirmative act by K.D. that caused or contributed to the explosion, the 
additional insured endorsement in the policy . . . did not provide coverage." jd. at 
454. The Texas Appellate Court rejected Admiral's argument as well as the 
holdings in the Granite and Northern Insurance Companv of New York cases, jd 
at fn.4. The Admiral court adopted 'the rule followed by the majority of courts 
around the country." jd. at 455. The Court specifically cited to and followed the 
holdings of Merchant's v. USF&G and Mclntosch v. Scottsdale previously 
discussed in this brief. In so doing, the Admiral court stated: 
[f]or liability to "arise out of operations" of a named 
insured it is not necessary for the named insured's acts 
to have "caused" the accident; rather, it is sufficient that 
the named insured's employee was injured while 
present at the scene in connection with performing the 
named insured's business, even if the cause of the 
injury was the negligence of the additional insured. 
id. at 454 (emphasis added). 
Subsequent to the Admiral decision, the Texas Court of Appeals revisited 
the issue of the construction/interpretation of additional-insured endorsements. In 
McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Continental Lloyd's Ins. Co.. 7 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App. 
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1999), the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that Texas followed the majority view in 
the interpretation of the phrase "arising out of." Id. at 729. McCarthy was a 
general contractor who hired Crouch Electric to provide electrical services for a 
construction project, id. at 727. McCarthy was named as an additional insured to 
the CGL policy issued to Crouch Electric by Continental Lloyd's insurance 
Company (Continental). An employee of Crouch Electric was injured when he 
slipped and fell at the construction site. id. The Crouch Electric employee sued 
McCarthy who then tendered the defense to Continental pursuant to McCarthy's 
status as an additional insured. Continental rejected the tender of defense 
because the allegations in the suit by the Crouch Electric employee alleged 
"negligence" only on the part of McCarthy, not on the part of Crouch, and thus the 
liability . . . did not arise out of Crouch's work for McCarthy." id. 
The McCarthy court specifically followed the holding of the Admiral Court 
and rejected the previous holding in Granite. The McCarthy court made 
reference to the definition of "arising out of" used in the Merchant's Insurance Co. 
v. USF&G case by stating, '"arising out of is broader than the concept of 
proximate causation and tort law...." lid. at 730. In support of its acceptance of 
the majority view, the court also made reference to the definition of "arising out of" 
found in the Mclntosch v. Scottsdale case, id. atfn.7. 
In finding that McCarthy was covered as an additional insured under the 
policy issued to Crouch Electric by Continental, the Texas Court of Appeals held: 
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The Insurance companies offer a competing 
interpretation for the phrase "arising out of that they 
claim is equally reasonable and thus creates an 
ambiguity. Their interpretation would limit the 
interpretation of "arising out of to mean coming directly 
from; i.e., for liability to arise out of Crouch's work for 
McCarthy, the liability must stem directly from Crouch's 
negligence and cannot extend to negligence caused 
solely by McCarthy. Post-Lindsay, however, such a 
restrictive interpretation no longer appears reasonable in 
Texas and cannot be used to create ambiguity. 
However, were we to consider the phrase "arising out 
of" ambiguous, we would apply the familiar rules that 
construe the policy against the insurer and reach the 
same result. 
Id. at 730-731 (emphasis added). 
It is clear that the majority of cases and jurisdictions who have dealt with 
the interpretation of additional insured endorsements and the meaning of "arising 
out of support the Trial Court's finding that Meadow Valley is entitled to a 
defense and indemnification for damages caused by the flooding on May 24, 
1997. 
II. UTAH CODE ANN. §13-8-1 APPLIES ONLY TO CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTS NOT LIABILITY INSURANCE CONTRACTS. 
Transcontinental attempts to apply Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1(2) in an effort 
to show that the insurance policy to which Meadow Valley is named as an 
additional insured cannot provide coverage for Meadow Valley's "negligenf 
actions. The statute states, "Except as provided in subsection (3), an 
indemnification provision in a construction contract is against public policy and is 
void and unenforceable." Transcontinental's theory is unwarranted as the statute 
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specifically applies only to indemnification provisions in construction contracts. 
By its terms, the statute does not apply to contractual obligations to provide or 
carry insurance. Further, the statute does not apply to the interpretation of 
insurance contracts. Finally, neither of the cases cited by Transcontinental 
address a subcontractor's contractual obligation to procure and maintain 
insurance for a general contractor or the interpretation of an insurance contract. 
As such they are easily distinguished. 
Transcontinental's theory has been addressed in other jurisdictions. A 
case which is directly on point is Shell Oil Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
PA, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. App. 2nd 1996). In Shell Oil, as in the present 
case, the construction contract in question contained an indemnity clause. The 
court found the indemnity clause to comply with the state statute which prohibited 
indemnification for the sole negligence of the indemnitee. The indemnity clause 
clearly stated that claims for injuries caused by Shell Oil's sole negligence were 
excluded and was, therefore, enforceable. The indemnity clause in the present 
case is similar to that contained in Shell Oil and complies with Utah law.1 As in 
the present case, the subcontract in Shell Oil contained a separate clause 
wherein the subcontractor was required to obtain liability insurance and name 
Shell Oil as an additional insured. Id. at 582. See also. R.71. 
1
 See, R.72, "the subcontractor's obligation under this provision shall not extend 
to any liability caused by the sole negligence of the indemnitee." 
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In Shell Oil, the insurance company, National, argued that a requirement 
within a construction contract to procure liability insurance was against public 
policy and barred by a state statute which invalidated construction contract 
indemnity agreements for an indemnitees' own negligence. The Shell Oil court 
held, "this doctrine in terms does not apply here because the obligation to be 
construed is not an indemnity clause . . . but rather an agreement to provide and 
carry insurance. Insurance, of course, is commonly provided to protect from 
liability for solitary negligence." Jd. at 585 (emphasis added). 
Transcontinental's theory that Utah law and public policy prohibit coverage 
for Meadow Valley under the insurance policy as an additional insured is a "red 
herring." By its terms, Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1(2) is applicable only to 
indemnification clauses contained within a construction contract. The 
indemnification clause within the Gallegos subcontract is not relevant to the 
interpretation of Gallegos' duties to procure and maintain insurance. Further, 
neither the indemnification clause within the subcontract nor Utah Code Ann. § 
13-8-1(2) are relevant for the purpose of interpreting the contract of insurance 
issued by Transcontinental. Accordingly, this Court should hold that Gallegos' 
duties to procure and maintain insurance under the subcontract do not 
contravene public policy. This Court should further hold that the insurance policy 
issued by Transcontinental provides coverage to Meadow Valley for the flooding 
which is at issue in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
This appeal involves the interpretation of the insurance contract issued by 
Transcontinental to which Meadow Valley was named as an additional insured. It 
does not involve a determination of negligence or proximate cause. 
Transcontinental recognized this distinction early in the case when its request to 
sever the two issues was granted. 
The evidence is clear that the flooding in question arose from work being 
performed pursuant to the Gallegos' subcontract. Further, it is clear that Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-8-1(2) does not apply to a requirement in a construction contract 
to procure and maintain insurance or the interpretation of an insurance contract. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
IV Respectfully submitted this ' day of November, 2000. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Jay E. Jensen 
Scott T. Evans 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Meadow 
Valley Contractors, Inc. 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this (^ day of November, 2000, two (2) copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Scott W. Christensen 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN 
& KANELL, P.C. 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Rex E. Madsen 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
